The present study examines the link between temperature and long-run productivity for a balanced panel of 21 countries, covering the period 1000-1800 CE. Collectively the countries examined accounted for about 2/3 of the global population by 1700. Each epoch in the analysis is a century long, which thus allows time for human adaptation after a temperature shock has occurred. Our principal …nding is that lower temperatures worked to reduce productivity growth during the period in focus, consistent with contributions to the literature in economic history that argue the Little Ice Age was as a contractionary shock.
Introduction
As temperatures have risen during the 20th century, and climate projections suggest additional warming of between 1.1 and 6.4 degrees Celsius during the 21st century (NRC, 2010), understanding the potential economic consequences of climate change on human societies has become a central issue among policy makers as well as academics. 1 The present study provides new evidence on the impact from long lasting climate shocks on productivity by examining the link between temperature and productivity growth across European and Asian countries during most of the second millennium -1000 CE to 1800 CE -using panel data regression analysis. Our principal …nding is that declining temperature led to declining productivity growth during the period in question, which is broadly consistent with contributions to the literature in economic history, discussed below, that argues the shift from the so-called "Medieval Warm period" (ca. 950-1250 CE) to "the Little Ice Age" (ca. 1550-1850) was a contractionary shock. 2 Our empirical strategy is similar in spirit to that of Dell et al. (2012) , who examine the link between temperature and GDP per capita during the post World War II period by employing panel data estimation. The objective is thus to obtain the best possible estimate of the reduced-form impact from temperature on labor productivity. In contrast to Dell et al. (2012) , however, we examine the impact from long-lasting temperature deviations from (very) long run averages; each of the time epochs in our panel is 100 years long.
Focusing on (very) long-run developments provide, we believe, useful complementary information about the link between climate shocks and productivity. In the existing literature a number of channels, which potentially link climate to growth, has been proposed: The list includes the potential impact on agricultural output (e.g., Greenstone and Deschênes, 2007); on health and labor supply (e.g., . As it seems likely that the (relative) impact of these (and other potential) channels may vary depending on the time horizon in focus, the net impact on productivity growth may also vary depending on the observation window. For instance, whereas a shock of a one year duration may have devastating e¤ects on the harvest, more persistent changes in climate may encourage human adaptation, which counteracts the initial shock. 3 If, on the other hand, human adaptation is ine¤ective and if the negative impact of climate change accumulates over time, the consequences of long term climate change could be more severe than those of year-to-year shocks. In the end, this issue can only be resolved empirically.
A challenge for the present study is how to measure productivity growth during the period in focus. Prior to the demographic transition, however, changes in productivity would work to change net fertility. In short, periods of plenty would tend to instigate population growth and thus greater population density (e.g., Ashraf and Galor, 2011; Dalgaard and Strulik, 2015) . Hence, in the analysis below we rely on population size as a marker for productivity. Along with reconstructed temperature data described below, we regress the former on the latter to tease out information about the long-run impact from temperature on productivity. It stands to reason that this data is noisy. However, under standard assumptions both sources of measurement error work to mute the link between temperature and productivity; either by in ‡ating standard errors (dependent variable measured with error), or by instigating an attenuation bias (independent variable measured with error). If anything, then, our estimates below should be viewed as a lower bound on the very long-run reduced-form e¤ect of temperature on growth. 4 In the analysis below we expose our baseline results to a battery of robustness checks. Since we are able to control for country-speci…c e¤ects, as well as region-speci…c time …xed e¤ects, the main threat to identi…cation is the potential for time-varying omitted variable bias. In this regard the major issue is whether the estimated impact from temperature on growth could be convoluting the in ‡uence from geographically related secular changes in the economies in focus that just happen to be correlated with temperature. For example, the post-Columbian period witnesses the emergence of trade across the Atlantic, which likely in ‡uences economic development in fundamental ways (Acemoglu et al., 2005) . If temperature changes are correlated with the extent of coastal orientation, our reduced form estimates will be biased, since the processes unleashed by the emergence of transatlantic trade would have preciously little to do with temperature per se. Hence, in the analysis below we carefully try to "…lter out" potentially geographically related time-varying information of this kind. Another worry could be that it is the variance of temperature (over a century), and not the temperature average, 3 For example, De Vries (1980) notes that Buckwheat, which requires a relatively short growing season, seems to have become more important in the Netherlands during the Little Ice Age, and declined in importance in the 18th century. See also Olmstead and Rhode (2011) on the di¤usion of wheat to colder and more arid areas of the US from the 19th century onwards. 4 Of course, even if data on GDP growth were available, such data would likely also be noisy indicators of economic activity. That at least seems to be the case for the post 1950 period; see, e.g., Johnson et al. (2013) . that matters to growth. These, and other, issues are confronted in the empirical analysis below. In the end our baseline results appear to be quite robust: during the period 1000 CE -1800 CE, and in the regions for which we have data, the impact from temperature and productivity growth is positive.
An increase in mean temperature by one degree Celsius instigates an increase in the annual average growth rate in productivity by 0.05 percentage points.
The present study is related to several previous contributions. First and foremost the study by Dell et al. (2012) …nd, for the post WWII period, that positive temperature shocks lower productivity growth in the poorest countries. In the present study, which focuses exclusively on poor and highly agriculturally dependent nations over a much longer period of time we …nd the opposite. Another related study is that by Waldinger (2014) . Waldinger investigates the reduced form link between temperature and city-level population across Europe; the panel covers the period 1500-1750. The main result is that increasing temperature served to increase urban population size. If urban population size is a sensible proxy for productivity this result is consistent with our country-level results, which pertain to an expanded window of observation. Also related is an earlier time series study by Galloway (1986), which focuses on the link between population growth and climate, using a solar activity index as a stand-in for temperature in Western Europe and China, respectively. Consistent with our results
Galloway …nds a positive link between solar activity and population growth in both Western Europe and China over the period from 400 BCE to 1800 CE. In contrast to Galloway, we are able to invoke country-level information on both population growth and temperature. 5 The present study is also related to a literature within economic history, which has debated the impact of climatic conditions on development during the second millennium CE. As discussed in the next section, arguments have been made that the Little Ice Age was everything from a negative destabilizing shock to (eventually) a bene…t, due to technological advances within agriculture prompted by adversities faced by European farmers due to the colder weather.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we discuss the work of (economic) historians with bearing on the topic at hand. Subsequently we develop the empirical strategy in Section 3. Section 4 describes our data, and Section 5 presents our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Little Ice Age and Development: Historical Perspectives
The current orthodoxy within climate research is to view the period 1000 CE until 1800 CE as encompassing two broad regimes: The Medieval Warm period (circa 1000-1200) and the so-called Little Ice Age. The timing of the Little Ice Age is a contested issue, and so is its global reach and detailed temporal characteristics. Mann (2002, p. 506) summarizes the evidence in the following way:
While the 17th century appears to represent the timing of peak cooling in Europe, the 19th century was more clearly the period of peak cold in North America...Even farther a …eld in eastern China, there is less evidence of any distinct cold period during the latter centuries of the millennium, with temperatures rather relatively uniformly depressed from about AD 1100-1800 Accordingly, while most climatologists appear to subscribe to the view that temperatures were depressed during the second millennium CE, until somewhere in the 19th century, the consensus also seems to be that the most dramatic cold spells were not necessarily synchronous across Eurasia.
Similarly, the causes of the cold spells is in debate; viable hypothesis include reduced solar activity levels and an increasing frequency of volcanic eruptions. 6 In terms of the consequences of the Little Ice Age to human societies, Lamb (1965) were among the …rst to argue that the Little Ice Age was a prime mover in leading to the collapse of the Norse settlements in Southern Greenland. A similar assessment is found in the more recent work of Diamond (2005) . The argument is that an increasingly colder environment led to the loss of livestock and to isolation from the European continent, which previously had been an important trading partner. 7 Since the Norse population appears to have been unwilling to learn from Greenland's indigenous population on how to survive in the arctic environment their fate was by all accounts sealed.
The European continent also seems to have felt the consequences of changing climatic conditions. Particular cold periods were experienced during the second half of the 16th century, and perhaps especially during the 17th century as observed by Mann (2002) . Over the years a number of contributions have o¤ered hypotheses about the likely impact from these shocks on the economy.
In his landmark contribution The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Fernand Braudel (1966) alluded to the possibility that the demise of the Mediterranean as the center 6 It should be noted that the notion of "A Little Ice Age" itself also has been challenged. For example, an entire issue of the journal Climate Change was in 2001 dedicated to the question of whether the term is warranted or not. For a recent installment to this debate, see Kelly and O'Grada (2014) who dismisses the notion of a Little Ice Age altogether. 7 Fagan (2000, p. 63) cites a letter by Alexander VI from 1492, where the Pope remarks that no ship is believed to have been ashore in Greenland for 80 years due to the freezing of the waters. of economic power during the 16th century could have been related to climatic factors:
If it is agreed ... that in about 1600 the weather did indeed become colder and wetter, it would also explain the frosts which were so disastrous for the olive trees and the frequent ‡oodings...not to mention the spread of marshland and consequently of malaria, creating overall conditions of increased di¢ culty for human life...The roots of the social crisis caused by the food shortage that dominated the end of the century may have lain in an alteration, even a very slight one, in the atmospheric conditions.
- Braudel (1966, p. 270) Arguably, however, conditions were not necessarily much better outside the Mediterranean basin. At the same time it should be pointed out that some economic historians do not share the view that climatic conditions in ‡uenced agriculture and mortality during the period 1500-1800. Fogel (1992), for instance, argues that the famines that England experienced between 1500 CE and 1800 CE were all man made and not due to climate shocks. Appelby (1980) similarly argues that the main epidemics between 1300 and 1800 (such as the Plague) were unlikely to have been facilitated by climatic conditions. 8 Finally, it has also been suggested that the climate induced adversities, faced by European farmers during the Little Ice Age, may ultimately have helped instigate an agricultural revolution across Europe, albeit perhaps not in equal measure everywhere (Fagan, 2000, Ch. 6 ).
In the end, therefore, it would seem premature to argue that a consensus, on the net impact of climate shocks on economic activity during the second millennium, has been reached within the historical literature. While some argue in favor of a destabilizing impact from declining temperatures, due to famine and disease, others argue that the impact was second order or even positive in the long run due to technological change prompted by the Little Ice Age. In the remaining we contribute to this debate by providing econometric evidence on the temperature/productivity nexus from the Medieval Warm period until the end of the Little Ice Age.
Empirical Strategy
The analysis conducted by Dell et al. (2012) starts from a growth accounting equation and proceeds by making assumptions about how temperature may impact on productivity; both in terms of levels and growth. In the present study we are faced by the challenge that no reliable data on GDP exist for the bulk of the time period studied. Hence, in order to make progress, we need some additional structure so as to enable the derivation of a viable regression model in observables that allows for a structural interpretation of the results.
In the analysis below we rely on the standard Malthusian macro model along the lines of Ashraf and Galor (2011). In their overlapping generations model, population is endogenous and determined by income per capita; higher living standards increases net fertility. If income per capita increases due to, for instance, a positive technology shock, population subsequently grows. When population increases, however, production per capita drops because of decreasing returns to labor. Eventually, when income has declined to the level of subsistence, population growth comes to a halt and the economy is in a steady state. In our baseline analysis, we abstract from transitional dynamics and assume the economy adjusts to its steady state within a period, implying that income per worker is "always" (i.e., at the time of empirical observation) at the subsistence level. This is not necessarily a bad assumption in the present case since each time period in our data set is 100 years long. 9 Nevertheless, we relax this assumption in a robustness check.
Hence, production per worker in country i at time t is assumed to be given by:
where Y it is production, L it is the labor force (i.e., the adult population), and it is the subsistence level of income, which implicitly convolutes preference parameters, the unit cost of children, and in ‡uences from the (child) mortality environment.
Total production at time t occurs according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A it captures the productivity level in the economy, and X is land employed in production. The level of productivity is to be interpreted broadly so as to include both technology and elements such as the suitability of land for agriculture.
Combining equations (1) and (2) one obtains:
Accordingly, this equation is assumed to hold at all points in time, t.
Moving beyond the standard framework, we assume that depends on temperature, T it :
where represents the reduced-form impact from temperature on subsistence income, implicitly capturing an impact of temperature on net fertility, mediated by disease or perhaps con ‡ict. 10 Moreover, 9 Moreover, focusing on steady state behavior in the context of empirical testing is a quite common approach in the literature; see, for instance, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) .
1 0 If only o¤spring that reach adulthood are costly to the household, child mortality will not a¤ect net fertility when preferences are Cobb-Douglas (e.g., Galor, 2011, Ch. 4). However, if there are costs of child bearing, regardless of whether the child survives long enough to reach reproductive age, greater child mortality will work to lower fertility (see Doepke, 2005) . and following Dell et al. (2012) , we assume that productivity is in ‡uenced by temperature:
Hence, we allow each country to-potentially-follow di¤erent productivity paths in terms of both the rate of the trend growth rate and the level of the trajectory. 11 The notion is that climatic shifts impacts directly on agricultural productivity, and perhaps indirectly on A via the incentive to innovate.
Taking logs and …rst di¤erences in equation (3) and using equations (5) and (4) yields
where l it ln L it ln L it 1 is population growth in country i during period t (between time t 1 and t), and T it is the mean temperature during period t. 12 Equation (6) can be formulated as a standard …xed-e¤ects regression model:
where i is a country …xed e¤ect, rt re ‡ects region-by-time …xed e¤ects and " i captures noise and omitted country-speci…c time-varying determinants of population growth. This is our baseline speci…-cation, and the coe¢ cients 1 ( + + ) = (1 ) and 2 ( + ) = (1 ) are the parameters of interest.
Accordingly, when studying the impact from temperature on the growth process, we allow the average productivity growth rate to vary from country to country through the …xed e¤ect i . In addition, we allow the average productivity growth rate to di¤er between regions (Europe, Asia) in a time varying fashion through r ; being relatively faster in Asia until 1500 CE and slower thereafter, for instance.
When estimating equation (7) it is clear that reverse causality is not going to be a concern.
Nor is it a concern that a host of time-varying structural characteristics that may be in ‡uenced by the evolution of temperature is omitted (e.g., con ‡ict). Rather, the obtained estimates for 1 and 2 are to be interpreted as the reduced-form e¤ect of temperature on population growth and thus 1 1 Technically speaking, Dell et al. (2012) allow the level e¤ect (e T it ) to enter the production function directly and separately specify a link between temperature and the growth rate of A. When the production function is Cobb-Douglas (as it is in Dell et al., 2012 and in the present context), the two formulations are isomorphic. 1 2 Along the way we invoke the approximation that ln (1 + x) x. productivity growth, mediated by such factors. However, there are four legitimate concerns that need to be confronted.
First, periods of changing average temperatures could also be periods of changing climatic variability. If so, and provided temperature variability matters to population growth in itself, our baseline estimates will be biased. 13 To deal with this issue, we examine the robustness of our baseline …ndings to the simultaneous inclusion of controls for temperature variation.
Second, nonlinearities of temperature could potentially be important. That is, perhaps small changes in average temperature are signi…cantly less important than larger shocks? To deal with this issue (misspeci…cation error) we also experiment with versions of (8) that allow temperature to enter in a non-linear fashion.
Third, one might worry that temperature could be spuriously correlated with geographic characteristics that feature a time-varying impact on productivity growth. For example, the period in focus witnessed a reversal in fortune with respect to absolute latitude; in 1500 CE the most densely settled and urbanized regions were found close to the equator, in contrast to the current state of a¤airs. If temperature changes were more marked during the period in (say) places closer to the equator, our estimates for the impact of temperature on population growth could be biased. 14 To deal with this concern we also control for a range of country-speci…c geographic characteristics, Z 0 i , interacted with time-period …xed e¤ects, P I j t . In these robustness checks, we estimate the following model:
Fourth, one may be concerned with the fact that we do not allow for convergence in our baseline speci…cation, that is, perhaps the steady-state assumption is inappropriate? To deal with this issue, the appendix shows that allowing for convergence motivates the following empirical speci…cation:
where l it 1 is the lagged population growth rate. As is well known, standard OLS estimates of equation (9) are biased (Nickell, 1981) . Hence, this speci…cation is somewhat more complicated to estimate than equations (7) and (8) . As a …rst approach, in dealing with this matter, we refer to the argument that …xed e¤ects estimation (without the lagged dependent variable) and lagged dependent variable estimation (without …xed e¤ects) are bounding the causal e¤ect (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As an alternative to this strategy, one could invoke a GMM approach, such as the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . But in the present context, where we are con…ned to a relatively "small N "sample, this approach, which relies on assymptotics in the cross-section dimension, may not be optimal. Instead we therefore utilize the bias-corrected least squares dummy variables estimator (Kivert, 1995; 1999; Bruno, 2005) .
As mentioned, the parameters of interest are (in all settings): 1 and 2 . The parameter 2 = ( + ) = (1 ) re ‡ects the level e¤ect which works through either productivity ( ) or subsistence consumption ( ). As 1 = = (1 ) + 2 ; the growth e¤ect ( ) can be obtained by subtracting the estimate of 1 from the estimate of 2 . Notice, however, we cannot disentangle the levels in ‡uence which runs through productivity from that which runs through subsistence consumption. Since temperature may in ‡uence productivity and mortality in opposite directions, a net impact of 2 0 does not necessarily imply that there are no level e¤ects on either one of these factors from temperature.
While this is a limitation of the present approach, our estimates for 2 does provide a rough guide to the plausible impact of temperature on the level of productivity if one is willing (guided by theory) to invoke priors on the in ‡uence from temperature on net fertility .
Data
The outcome variable is the centennial population growth rate for the period 1100-1900 CE, which has been constructed using population data from McEvedy and Jones (1978) . This is the standard source of historical population data typically used in the literature. 15 In principle, the McEvedy and Jones dataset spans the entire globe, however, for most countries data availability is very limited during the period 1000-1500 CE. As a result, our …nal dataset is a balanced panel of 21 countries, covering 18
European and three Asian countries. 16 While the number of countries perhaps seems somewhat small, these 21 countries together hosted 2/3 of the global population as of 1700. 17 Our main explanatory variable is the average temperature from 1000 CE to 1800 CE. We construct They combine these data in a statistical framework to predict worldwide historical data of average yearly temperature from 500 CE to 1995 CE for each 5x5 o grid cell. 18 We aggregate this data to the country level the following way: We …rst produce centennial averages of temperature for each grid cell, which produces nine observations of average temperature for each grid cell-one for each of the centuries from the 11th to the 19th century. We then produce country means by averaging the area-weighted grid cells across the modern-day border of the country in question for each century.
To identify the e¤ect of climate on development, we regress centennial changes in log population on the average temperature during the century controlling for country …xed-e¤ects. For this strategy to succeed there needs to be a reasonable amount of within-country variation in both variables.
Furthermore, since we include time-…xed e¤ects, the variation should not be dominated by common shocks across all countries. Finally. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables in the regression analysis. We see that the standard deviation of temperature is 4.71. This number, however, mainly re ‡ects crosssectional di¤erences in temperature. As our identi…cation comes from deviations in levels from the mean, we should evaluate the estimated model using the baseline statistics for 'temperature deviation', which has the mean -0.28 and a standard deviation of 0.28. The remaining variables used in the regression analysis are explained as they are introduced.
[ Table 1 about here] 
Population growth by country.
Notes: Circles indicate mean change in log population for each of the 9 centuries from the 11th to the 19th. Squares indicate mean change in log population across all 9 centuries. Table 2 reports the results from the baseline speci…cation (7). The …rst three columns include time …xed e¤ects, while the remaining columns also include country …xed e¤ects. The …nal column, which we consider as our preferred speci…cation, additionally control for time-by-region …xed e¤ects.
A number of features are notable in Table 2 . First, the estimates reveal a statistically signi…cant positive e¤ect of temperature on population growth only when controlling for country …xed e¤ects, suggesting that country heterogeneity in the growth rate of TFP-determined by unobserved country characteristics which are correlated with …xed climatic conditions-is important. In our preferred speci…cation, reported in column 7, the estimated coe¢ cient^ 1 is equal to 0.26 (standard error = 0.11). This implies that for a one degree lower temperature the population growth rate decreases by about 25 percentage point, which corresponds to an annual decrease in the population growth rate of 0.22 percentage points . Second, even though the estimated coe¢ cient^ 2 is statistically signi…cant at a 10 percent level in column 3, the e¤ect of the lagged value of temperature on population growth is, in the remaining columns, not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. For example, in our preferred speci…cation, we see that^ 2 = 0:00 (standard error = 0.23). This …nding is also con…rmed in our subsequent robustness analysis.
Turning to economic signi…cance, note from eqs. (6) and (7) that the coe¢ cients of interest are 1 = ( + + ) = (1 ) and 2 = ( + ) = (1 ) . As^ 1 > 0 and^ 2 = 0, the implication is that^ +^ = 0, while^ > 0, which means that the considered climate changes seem to have had no reduced-form impact on the level of population, but rather in ‡uenced productivity growth. If we take the share of land as one-third, that is, 1 = 1=3, and therefore set the labor share to = 2=3, this would imply that^ = 0:17 for^ 1 = 0:26. This estimate means that a one degree lower temperature is associated with an annual decrease in productivity growth of 0.15 percentage points. Figure 2 and the summary statistics, reported in Table 1 , reveal that the mean temperature deviation is -0.28 degrees.
Accordingly, on average the observed temperature shocks have served to lower long-run productivity by about 0.05 percentage points p.a.
[ Table 2 about here]
Robustness
This section establishes the robustness of our baseline …ndings of a positive signi…cant estimate on temperature and an insigni…cant estimate on the lagged value of temperature with respect to the chosen speci…cation.
Allowing for Convergence
Our …rst robustness check investigates the importance of the underlying assumption that countries are relatively close to their steady state when observed. As already mentioned, since each observation point is 100 years apart, the steady-state assumption may seem fairly reasonable. At the same time,
little is known about the rate of convergence during Malthusian times for which reason the check seems warranted. 19 Table 3 reports estimates controlling for lagged population growth to capture possible out-of steady state convergence, that is, mean-reverting dynamics in the outcome variable. The estimating equation is now eq. (9), which is more di¢ cult to estimate due to the simultaneous presence of …xed e¤ects and a lagged dependent variable. We deal with this in several ways.
First, we make use of a "bracketing property"; the "true"estimate (in the absence of other biases)
is bounded by, on the one side, the estimate obtained with …xed e¤ects and no lagged dependent variable, and, on the other side, the estimate obtained without …xed e¤ects but allowing for the lagged dependent variables (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Chapter 5).
In the …rst three columns we show the results from estimating the model with a lagged dependent variable without country …xed e¤ects; we shall label these estimates^ N F E . From column 3 we observe Table 2 . Accordingly, the principal baseline …nding of an impact from temperature on growth appears fairly robust, with a point estimate somewhere between 0:26 and 0:32: Table 3 about here Arguably, however, the Nickell bias is less important in "large T " samples. In particular, Barro (2015) argues that the so-called Nickell bias depends on the overall length of the sample period rather than the number of periods. By implication, the Nickell bias from estimating eq. (9) with country …xed e¤ects should be limited as we are considering a sample length of 800 years. Our second check, therefore, consists of including …xed e¤ects in our lagged dependent variable speci…cation. As seen from columns 4-7, the results are very similar to the baseline results, consistent with the argument laid out in Barro (2015) .
As a third and …nal check we employ the bias-corrected LSDV estimator suggested by Bruno (2005). The results are rather similar to our baseline estimates, albeit the two-step procedure (and associated loss of observations) makes for less precise estimates (see column 8). Overall, these checks show that our results are not sensitive to whether we allow for convergence or not.
Time-varying determinants of population growth
Another main worry regards the presence of time-varying determinants of population growth that are spuriously related to temperature. As observed above, the period in focus may well have experienced changes in productivity that were induced by geographic factors (such as institutional changes related to coastal orientation); if said geographic factors are correlated with temperature our estimates may be biased.
Accordingly, in Table 4 for allow for a rich set of geographic factors that are interacted with time …xed e¤ects: longitude, latitude, percentage of land near water, irrigation potential, elevation, roughness, and agricultural land suitability (cf. equation 8). The estimates presented in Table 4 show that the baseline conclusion is robust to the mentioned geographical interactions. In fact, the e¤ect of temperature is larger in magnitude and remains statistical signi…cant at the 5 percent level when subjected to all the controls at once in column 7. The estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged value of temperature is in some speci…cations negative and in others positive, however, it remains far from crossing conventional levels of statistical signi…cance. 
Nonlinearities and temperature variability
A third issue relates to nonlinearities; the in ‡uence of temperature may not be linear. To check, Table   5 augments the baseline speci…cation by allowing for squared terms. As seen from columns 1-3, the point estimates on the linear terms do not change appreciably, albeit they do become somewhat less precisely estimated, while the point estimates on the square terms are statistically highly insigni…cant.
Table 5 about here
Related to nonlinearities is the position that productivity may be more importantly in ‡uenced by climate variability. To check we computed a measure of temperature variability, which we subsequently included in our baseline speci…cation, alongside mean temperature. 20 The …ndings are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 5 . We …nd no e¤ects of changes in climate variability as measured by the standard deviation of temperature (Temperature SD) and the lagged value of this variable (Temperature SD lag), whereas the e¤ect of temperature remains reassuringly stable in economical and statistical signi…cance.
The estimated coe¢ cients suggest the e¤ect of temperature on productivity growth is monotonic during the considered period.
Sample Splits
The countries in our sample varies greatly in size. As this may matter in terms of how resilient a country is to shocks (small countries may be more vulnerable) it seems worthwhile to examine whether "size matters" to the temperature/productivity nexus, for the period in question. Moreover, one may hypothesize that the in ‡uence of temperature on productivity may depend on the level of temperature itself. That is, perhaps the impact from changes in temperature di¤ers if the country experienced high or low temperatures initially.
Columns 1-7 of Table 6 study the in ‡uence of small countries, as measured by population and area size. Columns 1 starts by excluding the small island countries: Iceland, Malta, and Cyprus. We …nd that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is reduced by about 15 percent compared to the baseline estimate, and since it is also somewhat less precisely estimated, the e¤ect is only signi…cant at the 17 percent level. This suggests that smaller nations might indeed be more sensitive to climate pertubations. Table 6 about here Yet, one may legitimately wonder if the conclusion of a positive impact-on average-from temperature on growth critically hinges on the presence of the island economies, or smaller nations in general. If this is the point of concern the above check is likely too extreme since there is no particular reason why the information conveyed by the three islands in our sample should be ignored altogether.
Hence, in columns 2-4 we provide alternative tests where a potential small-country issue is taken into account by weighted regression analysis. The weighted least square estimates-using, respectively, arable land, population size in 1000 CE, and population density 1000 CE as weights-are positive and within the range of the baseline magnitude. Statistically the result are signi…cant at least at the 10 percent level of signi…cance.
Columns 5-7 investigate alternative potential heterogeneity in terms of population size by splitting the sample based on the median population in 1000 CE. Columns 5 and 6 demonstrate that the e¤ect of temperature on productivity growth is larger for less populated countries, while column 7 demonstrate that the baseline result is una¤ected in magnitude and statistical signi…cance when allowing for di¤erent time trends in countries that initially were above or below median population density.
Finally, columns 8-10 propose a similar test based on initial median temperature. According to the reported estimates, there seems to be no heterogeneity of the e¤ect of temperature on productivity growth in relation to whether we consider a relatively warm or cold climate.
Turning from sample pertubations in the "N-dimension" to the "T-dimension", one may wonder how the period that witnessed the onset of the "Black Plague" is a¤ecting our estimates. As seen in Figure 1b , the population growth rate in 1400 is negative for most countries in the sample. This pattern is undoubtedly related to the spread of the Black Death in Europe during the period 1346-53, which may or may not be reacted to climate, as discussed in Section 2. Table 7 therefore reports on the qualitative robustness of the results using a 200-year panel speci…cation from 1100 CE to 1700 CE, which, thus, excludes the post Black-Death century (i.e., the 15th century). It is reassuring to see that the baseline …nding is if anything larger in magnitude (i.e., 1 = 0:47; standard error = 0:18), while there remains no e¤ect of the lagged value (i.e.,^ 2 = 0:04; standard error = 0:65). Hence, the onset of the Black plague only seems to mute the impact from temperature on growth, rather being key in explaining the presence of the "temperature gradient"
itself. 
Concluding remarks
The present study provides estimates of the impact from temperature shocks on growth during the period from 1000 CE -1800 CE for 21 European and Asian countries. Our best estimates suggest that the shift from the Medieval Warm period to the Little Ice Age was contractionary in nature:
lower temperatures instigated slower productivity growth. These results are consistent with contributions within economic history that view the Little Ice Age as having been detrimental to economic development.
A natural question to ponder is the extent to which the present results have bearing on what one should expect from global warming, in the years to come. Naturally, any such expectation will inevitably have to rely (in part, at least) on historical experiences. To be sure, in existing (so-called)
Integrated Assessment Models the link between temperature and economic activity is parameterized on the basis of empirical estimations using historical data. In this regard our results might be a useful addition to the information set.
At the same time there are two important caveats worth bearing in mind. First, our analysis only comprises countries from Europe and Asia. In other words, our analysis carries no information on what might have transpired in arrid, or (sub-) tropical, areas around the world. These are the areas that often are expected to feel the consequences of global warming the most, and our analysis does not speak to the historical record of such regions. Second, our historical analysis only concerns the link between temperature and productivity; we are not able to separately control for precipitation due to data constraints. Insofar as the association between temperature and rainfall during the second millennium is expected to be di¤erent from that in the future, our reduced form result may not be a good guide to the impact of temperature changes going forward. Assuming log utility and that people reproduce in proportion to their number, it follows that the number of inhabitants of the economy in generation t + 1 is (for ease of exposition we drop the country index i from the derivations):
t in theory convolutes preference parameters, the unit cost of children, and in ‡uence from the (child) mortality environment. Y t is total income in generation t. t is determined by temperature:
Production is given by
where technology A t is determined by equation (5) . Combining equations (10) and (12), the following law of motion for population size obtains:
It is straight forward to show that, in the absence of temperature shocks, the model admits a unique globally stable steady state where population is constant. Taking logs and time di¤erences of (13) results in:
This empirical speci…cation which corresponds to this equation is (9) of Section 3. Notes: Observations are reported at the country level every century over the period 1000-1800. The outcome variable is the log growth rate of population size. Temperature is the average temperature (in degree celsius) during the preceding century. Temperature lag is temperature lagged one period (i.e., a century). We refer to the data appendix for further details. Constants are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Observations are reported at the country level every century over the period 1000-1800. The outcome variable is the log growth rate of population size. Temperature is the average temperature (in degree Celsius) during the preceding century. Temperature lag is temperature lagged one period (i.e., a century).
The controls longitude, latitude, % of land near water, irrigation potential, elevation, roughness, agr. land suitability are interacted with a full set of time …xed e¤ects. We refer to the data appendix for further details. Constants are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Observations are reported at the country level every century over the period 1000-1800. The outcome variable is the log growth rate of population size. Temperature is the average temperature (in degree Celsius) during the preceding century. Temperature lag is temperature lagged one period (i.e., a century).
Column 1 excludes the countries: Iceland, Malta, and Cyprus. Columns 2-4 report weighted least square estimates. The weights are, respectively: log arable land, log population size in 1000, and log (1 + population density in 1000). Column 5 and 6 split the sample into above and below median population size in 1000. Column 7 interacts time …xed e¤ects with a dummy for above/below median population size in 1000. Columns 8-9 split the sample into above and below median temperature in 1000. Column 10 interacts time …xed e¤ects with a dummy for above/below median temperature in 1000. Constants are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
